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Abstract - The purpose of this paper is to present some directions to perform the risk man-
agement for information security. The article follows to practical methods through question-
naire that asses the internal control, and through evaluation based on existing controls as 
part of vulnerability assessment. The methods presented contains all the key elements that 
concurs in risk management, through the elements proposed for evaluation questionnaire, list 
of threats, resource classification and evaluation, correlation between risks and controls and 
residual risk computation. 
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Introduction 
Research on risk has evolved from an ap-
proach based on the negative dimension of 
the risk to a complex approach, where the 
risk is seen as a threat and as an opportunity. 
Risk management for  information  security 
consists in risk assessment, risk control and 
documentation, and risk reporting [2].  
Risk management for information security is 
an iterative process  that passes through 
interconnected steps, from risk assessment, 
risk control and  documentation,  to risk 
reporting.  
A risk management approach must address at 
least  the  following  criteria: the criteria for 
risk assessment, the impact criteria, and the 
risk acceptance criteria [3].  
Beside this, the organization assess whether 
it has the necessary resources to perform: risk 
assessment and the development of a risk 
treatment plan, definition  and 
implementation of  policies and procedures, 
including the implementation of selected 
controls for risk treatment, controls 
monitoring, risk management process 
monitoring.  
Risk assessment criteria are developed to 
assess  information security  risks on the 
organization, taking into account the 
following [1]:  
•  strategic value of information processes 
within the organization;  
•  the importance of information assets 
involved;  
•  legal requirements and contractual 
obligations;  
•  organization and operational importance 
of the availability, confidentiality and 
integrity of information;  
•  expectations and perceptions of 
shareholders, customers and suppliers of 
the company and the negative 
consequences it can have on reputation.  
Impact criteria are developed and specified 
as the level of damage caused or the cost for 
organization,  produced  by  an event that 
affected the security of information, taking 
into account: the classification of information 
assets affected;  the security gap produced 
(loss of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability); affected operations (internal or 
external); financial losses; delay in meeting 
deadlines;  loss of reputation for  the 
organization.  
Risks treatments involve choosing an action 
or response strategy for each risk analyzed, 
and present it in the risk treatment plan. The 
treatment  options, that  are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive or appropriate in all 
cases, include the following:  
•  risk avoidance eliminates  uncertainty by 
not undertaking the actions appreciated as 
very risky to the business.  Usually for 
critical risks this method may be applied 
for avoidance.  
•  risk  transfer  by using risk ownership 
transfer, or by using insurance, guarantees 
or contractual clauses;  
•  reduce risk by changing the risk exposure 
(through impact and / or probability 
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mitigation). The measures listed in this 
category can be used both when 
identifying and assessing risk, and also at 
the time of their occurrence,  and  are 
aimed at either reducing the likelihood or 
impact or both components of risk. 
Methods to reduce risk:  
o  implementation of security controls;  
o  improving procedures;  
o  changing  the  environment by 
reducing exposure to vulnerabilities;  
o  implementation of early detection 
methods to catch the threat when it 
happens and to reduce potential 
damage that this may cause;  
o  change continuity plan,  to address 
how the business can continue if  a 
specific threat appears;  
o  security  awareness  training sessions 
where applicable.  
•  risk acceptance, relates to getting approval 
from  top  management to accept the 
current level of risk,  without 
implementing  security measures. This 
approach  is preferable in the  situations 
where the cost of implementing protective 
measures exceeds  the benefits, or when 
the level of risk is necessary for business 
development.  
Risk acceptance criteria depend on policies, 
objectives and interests of parties involved in 
the organization. Organizations define their 
own classification of risk acceptance levels, 
taking into account the following [4]:  
•  risk acceptance criteria include multiple 
thresholds, each associated with a risk 
level, present in the risk treatment plan;  
•  risk acceptance criteria must be expressed 
as a percentage of estimated profit (or 
other benefits of the organization) 
associated with the estimated risk;  
•  different risk acceptance criteria apply to 
different classes of risks, such as non-
acceptance of non-compliance risks, while 
high risks can be accepted as a contractual 
requirement;  
•  risk acceptance criteria  for high risks 
include additional treatments, such as 
commitments and approvals that will be 
taken to reduce risk to an acceptable level 
in a defined time period.  
Risk acceptance criteria  are  different, 
corresponding to the period in which the risk 
exists (long or short term). The development 
of risk management process for information 
security, involves a careful identification of 
assets, threats to those assets, and 
vulnerabilities to which they are exposed. 
The results of these activities are used to 
assess risk and to  identify risks that need 
treatment [6].  
To assess the likelihood of a threat, we have 
to assess how long the asset will have value 
or for how long it has to be protected. The 
likelihood  of  a threat is affected by the 
following [5]:  
•  attractiveness of the asset or the possible 
impact that occurs when a deliberate 
action is taken into account;  
•  how easy it is to convert  vulnerability 
exploitation into earnings, when deliberate 
action is taken into account;  
•  technical capabilities of the agent who 
carries the threat, applicable for deliberate 
actions;  
•  susceptibility of vulnerability exploitation, 
which applies to technical and non-
technical vulnerabilities.  
 
2  Methods for information security risk 
management 
The following approaches are proposed for 
risk management: questionnaire method for 
assessing internal control, and evaluation 
based on existing controls as part of vulnera-
bility assessment. 
Method based on the use of questionnaires 
to assess the internal control starts from the 
inherent risk assessment, depending on the 
probability of occurrence of a risk scenario 
(threat exploiting a vulnerability) and the im-
pact on the organization's resources, as the 
following questionnaire to assess the internal 
control and calculate the residual risk re-
maining after implementation of controls. 
The method uses a list of threats that underlie 
the definition of risk scenarios and resources 
affected by the risk scenarios are evaluated in 
terms of loss of confidentiality, integrity, 
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class level. The method first calculates the 
risk inherent risk that obtained by assessing 
the likelihood and impact for each risk scena-
rio that is applied to resources within the or-
ganization. Existing controls within the or-
ganization, which are assessed by question-
naire, are correlated with risk defined 
through a correlation matrix, and thus obtain 
the value defined for each risk controls, with 
which we calculate the residual risk remain-
ing after application of the controls. Residual 
risk is classified according to Table 1,  me-
dium and critical risks will be included in the 
risk treatment plan reduce risk to an accepta-
ble level for the organization. 
Risk treatment plan based on the medium and 
critical risks, includes the proposed measures 
for implementation, with deadlines, respon-
sible and risk residual value expected to be 
achieved after the implementation of the plan 
to verify that sufficient measures are pro-
posed and approved, but also to have a basis 
for measuring the results.  
Inherent risk (IR) is calculated using the fol-
lowing formula: 
IR = P x I 
where: 
P - probability that the risk scenario will oc-
cur; 
I - the impact on the organization. 
Probability will be evaluated using the levels 
defined in Table 1.
 
Table 1. Probability levels description 
Level  Frequency of oc-
currence 
Description  Probability  
interval 
1  Very rarely  May occur in  exceptional 
circumstances 
0 – 0.1 
2  Rarely  It can sometimes occur  0.1 – 0.3 
3  Medium  Almost equal chance of oc-
currence 
0.3 - 0.6 
4  Probably  Appears frequent  0.6 - 0.9 
5  Almost certain  Appears often   0.9 - 1 
 
The possible levels of impact are: 1 – insigni-
ficant; 2 – minor; 3 – moderate; 4 – major; 5 
- catastrophic. Inherent risk values are pre-
sented in the following table: 
 
Table 2. Inherent risk values 
Probability  IR = P x I 
5  5  10  15  20  25 
4  4  8  12  16  20 
3  3  6  9  12  15 
2  2  4  6  8  10 
1  1  2  3  4  5 
  1  2  3  4  5 
Impact 
 
Minimum risk 
(acceptable) 
 
Medium 
risk 
 
Critical 
risk 
 
The following steps are applied in develop-
ing the method: 
a) For each control that is evaluated to de-
velop a set of questions; they may be sin-
gle or multiple answer questions, but with 
the maximum response value of  10;  the 
answers are aggregated at the control lev-
el, as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Questionnaire 
No.  Control / question / answer  Response 
selected 
Possi-
ble an-
swers 
value 
Ques-
tion 
value 
Control val-
ue (average 
value of 
questions) 
C1  Responsibilities assigned for in-
formation security        9 
Q1 
Is there a clear definition of roles 
and  responsibilities for the man-
agement of various information 
security issues? 
One 
response    10   
  No    0     
  Yes, but not formally    5     
  Yes, formally  x  10     
Q2  Which of the following responsi-
bilities are formally assigned? 
Multiple 
response    8   
  Information Security Officer  x  2     
  Application administrator/OS/DB  x  2     
  Application developer / design    2     
  Application testing  x  2     
  Users  x  2     
 
b) The list of threats to information security 
is developed. Based on experience, the 
following list of threats has been devel-
oped: 
 
Table 4. List of threats 
No.  Threat  Definition 
1  Fire  An outbreak of fire which destroyed part of the organization's 
headquarters. 
2  Earthquake  Earthquake with a magnitude severe enough to affect the organ-
ization's operations. 
3  Flooding  Water infiltration or flooding as a result of cracks in walls, ceil-
ings, broken windows, damaged water pipes.   
4  Unauthorized 
network access 
Penetration activity in a computer system, computer network 
with the intent to steal, corrupt data, information, or to impede 
the functioning of the organization's operations. Unauthorized 
access can be external / internal, intentional / unintentional, 
such as virus attacks, hacker attempts, denial of service attacks. 
5  Theft and sabo-
tage 
Unauthorized removal, theft, modification, destruction of the 
organization's resources: hardware, software, paper documents, 
electronic documents. Any unauthorized use of  intellectual 
property or organization outside the organization processes ap-
plications.  
6  Inadequate use of 
applications 
Use of unauthorized and/or unlicensed applications on the or-
ganization's systems, misuse of business applications by em-
ployees. 
7  Equipment dam-
age 
Failure of IT equipment (servers, network equipment), or those 
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8  Utilities failure 
Feathers in the provision of utilities are incidents that can cause 
an interruption of the operations organization and processes for 
a time: power failure, communication line failure. 
9  Human error 
Human errors can be caused by negligence or lack of informa-
tion, knowledge of the organization's staff, leading to disruption 
of normal activities. 
10  Insufficient staff 
Mass of staff absence, which may lead to disruption of normal 
activities of the organization. Lack of staff may be voluntary 
and/or planned the strike, or spontaneous and unplanned, vaca-
tion due to bad weather, pandemic. 
11  Extreme tempera-
ture and humidity 
High heat can cause damage to magnetic media and equipment. 
The high humidity can cause corrosion of equipment. 
12  Terrorism  The terrorist attack on or near a permanent, could affect the or-
ganization's IT operations. 
13  Legislative 
changes 
Legislative changes that may affect the organization's opera-
tions. 
14  Social engineer-
ing 
The staff of the organization may be confused and / or misdi-
rected to obtain sensitive information. 
 
c) Classification and evaluation of resources 
by confidentiality, integrity, availability 
and authenticity; 
 
Table 5. Resources classification and evaluation 
No.  Resource 
category  Resource type  C  I  A  Au  Resource 
value 
1  Information  Application  5  5  5  5  g(C,I,D,Au) 
2  Documents on paper  4  5  5  4  g(C,I,D,Au) 
3 
Infrastructure 
Software   5  5  5  5  g(C,I,D,Au) 
4  Hardware   5  5  5  4  g(C,I,D,Au) 
5  Buildings and utilities  3  3  4  2  g(C,I,D,Au) 
6 
Personnel 
Operational and management 
personnel  4  3  4  3  g(C,I,D,Au) 
7  Nonoperational personnel  5  5  5  5  g(C,I,D,Au) 
8  Communica-
tion 
Communication equipment  5  5  5  5  g(C,I,D,Au) 
9  E-mail   5  5  4  5  g(C,I,D,Au) 
 
The description of the quality characteristics 
levels are defined based on the impact on the 
resources. 
 
Table 6. Quality characteristics (C, I, A, Au) levels description  
Level  Description 
1 
Cases in which there is no impact on resources, if the quality characteristic is 
compromised. 
2 
Cases in which the impact on resources is reduced, if the quality characteristic is 
compromised. 
3 
Cases in which the impact on resources is medium, if the quality characteristic is 
compromised. 
4 
Cases in which the impact on resources is high, if the quality characteristic is 
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5 
Cases in which the impact on resources is very high, if the quality characteristic 
is compromised. 
 
d) Risk scenarios are defined, that may affect 
the organization's resources, based on the 
above threats, each scenario involving a 
probability level; 
The impact is calculated using the follow-
ing formula: 
j RV I
j
i
i ∑
=
=
1
 
where: 
j      - the resource types affected by a risk 
scenario; 
RV - resource value. 
 
Table 7. Risk scenarios  
  Risk scenario    Affected re-
source types 
  Inherent 
risk 
No.  Threat  Vulnerability  P  R1  …  R9  I  IR (P x I) 
1  Flooding  Lack of technical veri-
fication of pipelines  3  x    x  3,8  11,4 
2 
Unautho-
rized net-
work access 
Unclear or incorrect al-
location of information 
security responsibilities 
5  x  x  x  4,2  21 
3 
Unautho-
rized net-
work access 
Poor management of 
incidents  5  x  x  x  4,2  21 
4  Human er-
ror 
Reporting scheme mi-
sunderstanding  4    x  x  4  16 
5  Insufficient 
staff 
Absenteeism due to 
pandemic  4    x    4  16 
 
e) Development of correlation matrix be-
tween scenarios and controls and evalua-
tion of controls for each risk scenario 
 
Table 8. Scenarios – controls correlation 
  Applied controls value  21,25  18,33  16,25  17,5  21,25 
No.  Scenario 
Control  1  2  3  4  5 
C1  Responsibilities assigned for infor-
mation security  9  9    9  9 
C2  Compliance with safety requirements 
in relation to third parties    5  5  5   
C3  Protection of physical storage media 
in transit  8  8  8    8 
 
Applied controls value is calculated us-
ing the following formula: 
5 , 2 * ) (
1
k C CV
k
i
i ∑
=
=  
where: 
k - controls applied to the selected sce-
nario; 
C - control value. 
f)  Computation of residual risk after con-
trols implementation, for the selected 
scenario: 
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Table 9. Residual risk computation 
  Risk scenario  Inherent 
risk 
Applied con-
trols value 
Residual 
risk 
No.  Threat  Threat  IR  CV  IR-CV 
1  Flooding  Lack of technical veri-
fication of pipelines  11,4  21,25  -9,85 
2 
Unauthorized 
network 
access 
Unclear or incorrect 
allocation of informa-
tion security responsi-
bilities 
21  18,33  2,66 
3 
Unauthorized 
network 
access 
Poor management of 
incidents  21  16,25  4,75 
4  Human error  Reporting scheme mi-
sunderstanding  16  17,5  -1,5 
5  Insufficient 
staff 
Absenteeism due to 
pandemic  16  21,25  -5,25 
 
Residual risk is classified according to table 
2, medium and critical risks will be included 
in the risk treatment plan. 
Method based on an assessment of existing 
controls as part of  vulnerability  assess-
ment seeks risk evaluation as the current lev-
el of risk in the organization, taking into ac-
count existing controls. In this method affects 
the vulnerability of controls taken into ac-
count when calculating risk. The level of 
threat and value of the resource risk assess-
ment is set at the beginning and remain un-
changed during the annual or biannual 
process of risk management, pending 
changes in the computer systems of the or-
ganization. For risks that do not fall within 
the acceptable risk, the treatment plan to es-
tablish new controls will be implemented to 
reduce risk and assess the vulnerabilities that 
will be achieved after implementation. 
Risk (RI) is given by the following formula: 
RI = TL x VL x RV 
where: 
TL - threat level defined in table 10; 
VL - vulnerability level defined in table 10; 
RV - resource value. 
 
Table 10. Threat and vulnerability levels 
Threat evaluation 
Level  Description 
1  Unlikely or without known precedent. 
2  Occurrence probability is once every two years. 
3  Occurrence probability is once every quarter. 
Vulnerability evaluation 
Level  Description 
1  Controls operate effectively guaranteed at every occurrence of the threat. 
2 
The controls are partially effective and will work in most cases of the threat oc-
currence. 
3 
Controls, most likely, will fail at the emergence of the threat, or there is no con-
trol to mitigate the threat. 
 
Risk values thus obtained are classified ac-
cording to table 11. In this approach the or-
ganization may intervene in the modification 
of the vulnerability level through controls 
implemented. 
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Table 11. Risk values 
  Threat level  1  2  3 
  Vulnerability level  1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3 
  1  1  2  3  2  4  6  3  6  9 
Resource 
value 
2  2  4  6  4  8  12  6  12  18 
3  3  6  9  6  12  18  9  18  27 
  4  4  8  12  8  16  24  12  24  36 
  5  5  10  15  10  20  30  15  30  45 
 
The following steps are applied in develop-
ing this approach: 
a) assessment of organizational resources in 
terms of confidentiality, integrity, availa-
bility and authenticity; 
b) threats evaluated based on the level de-
scribed in table 10; 
c) vulnerability assessment for each threat, 
taking into account existing controls with-
in the organization, as listed in the table 
below: 
 
Table 12. Vulnerability assessment 
Risk  Threat  Vulnerability  Affected re-
sources  Existing controls  VL 
1 
Fire 
Presence of flam-
mable materials 
 
Information, in-
frastructure, 
personnel, 
communication  
The presence of flamma-
ble materials is not per-
mitted on the premises of 
the organization 
1 
2 
Failure to detect a 
fire  startup 
 
Information, in-
frastructure, 
personnel, 
communication 
The organization's head-
quarters has installed 
smoke detectors  
1 
3  Failure responding 
to a fire startup 
Information, in-
frastructure, 
personnel, 
communication 
The organization is pro-
vided with  fire extin-
guishing, which are 
checked regularly 
2 
4  Floods 
Lack of a technical 
verification of 
pipelines 
Information, in-
frastructure, 
communication 
The organization has de-
fined maintenance pro-
grams for facilities 
1 
5 
Unautho-
rized net-
work access 
Unclear or incor-
rect allocation of 
information securi-
ty responsibilities 
Information, in-
frastructure, 
personnel, 
communication 
The organization has de-
fined staff responsibili-
ties for information secu-
rity 
2 
 
d) Risk assessment taking into account exist-
ing controls is performed, and residual 
risk is obtained: 
 
Table 13. Residual risk value 
No.  Risk  TL  VL  RV  RI 
1  R1  3  1  5  15 
2  R2  3  1  5  15 
3  R3  3  2  5  30 
4  R4  3  1  5  15 
5  R5  3  2  4  24 Informatica Economică vol. 15, no. 1/2011    159 
 
 
 
Regardless of the approach for risk analysis, 
because this is done annually, it is recom-
mended to develop a system of indicators to 
alert the responsible persons in respect of 
changes to the results obtained in previous 
analysis, which require a reassessment before 
the deadline established. This system of indi-
cators should address most of the risks identi-
fied within the organization. 
The risk analysis performed can also be used 
in business discontinuity, by providing the 
key risks that can interrupt the business 
processes. These risks are used for compiling 
a list of likely disaster scenarios and analyze 
their effects on processes, development of 
business continuity management strategies, 
define business continuity plan and proce-
dures for continuity related.  
 
3 Conclusions 
Risk analysis on information security is im-
portant in any organization, in terms of en-
suring the maintenance of controls imple-
mented and for management risks evolutions. 
The monitoring of the risk indicators has to 
be defined and carefully performed in order 
to capture the modification of risk exposures 
for the organization. 
 
Acknowledgement 
This work was supported by CNCSIS-
UEFISCSU, project number PNII –  IDEI 
1838/2008. 
 
References 
[1] I.  Ivan,  G.  Noşca, S. Capisizu,  Auditul 
sistemelor informatice, Editura ASE, 
Bucureşti,  2005,  ISBN:  978-973-594-
638-6  
[2] ISO/IEC 27002:2005 Information 
technology -- Security techniques -- Code 
of practice for information security man-
agement  
[3] J. Pathak, Information Technology Audit-
ing An Evolving Agenda, Editura Sprin-
ger, Berlin, 2005 
[4] J. Schalken, H. Vliet, “Measuring where 
it matters: Determining starting points for 
metrics collection”,  Journal of Systems 
and Software, Elsevier, Vol. 81, Issue 5, 
2007, pp. 603-615 
[5] S. Vacca, “Risk Based Compliance Pro-
grams: Models of Success”, Governance, 
Risk and Compliance Conference, The 
Institute of Internal Auditors, Florida, 
2008 
[6] M. Eppler, M. Aeschimann, “A Systemat-
ic Framework for Risk Visualization in 
Risk Management and Communication”, 
Risk Management, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2009, 
pg. 67-89. 
 
 
 
 
Cristian AMANCEI is University Assistant at Academy of Economics Stu-
dies Bucharest, Faculty of Economic Cybernetics, Statistics and Informatics. 
He is a PhD candidate from October 2007 at Economic Informatics Depart-
ment from Academy of Economic Studies. He holds a Master in Science – 
Computerized Project Management from Academy of Economic Studies, 
Bucharest. He is Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA). He graduat-
ed in Economic Informatics at Faculty of Economic Cybernetics, Statistics 
and Informatics in 2006. His main research areas are: information system audit, data struc-
tures, metrics in information systems, IT controls and IT risks. 
 